Intro
如果您正在追求顽固的债务人或复杂的欺诈者，那么恰好使用比特币等加密货币，你可能会觉得你遇到了死胡同。如何从一个专门脱离他们在数字货币中掩盖财富的人那里恢复资产？好吧，正如Burford最近的案例研究表明一样，可以使用选择并且恢复的路径存在，只要您知道要询问谁以及在哪里看起来。
什么是加密电脑？
Bitcoin (BTC) is a digital currency based on a protocol that allows data to be stored in a transparent and unalterable way in a decentralised ledger, essentially, a database that everyone has a copy of, known as the Blockchain. Bitcoin is the first example of a cryptocurrency, an asset class similar to that of traditional “fiat” currencies, but whose supply is controlled by lines of code, rather than central banks. Transactions are verified using cryptography. Cryptocurrencies are typically traded via exchanges, which act as digital marketplaces connecting buyers with sellers, and stored using digital wallets.
关于比特币的匿名性和不可用的加密验证和加密的匿名是写的，用于确保区块链中的事务记录。这不是秘密这就是为什么它经常被犯罪分子，技术人士和投资者所吸引。事实上，正是因为如果这种潜在的技术，任何大小的任何大小的任何比特币交易都是公开的可观看的，那么你就可以了解你想要的东西！
Background
Our case study concerns two UK residents (for our purposes here let’s refer to them as Smith and Jones) who ran a series of fraudulent schemes that netted them tens of millions of pounds. After the frauds were uncovered, Smith and Jones entered insolvency, no doubt hoping to come out clean the other side upon discharge. Needless to say, Smith and Jones were not forthright with the trustees and the investigation uncovered neither assets recoupable to the estate nor answers concerning the whereabouts of the millions in pilfered investor funds. If the trustees were to make any recovery, it was clear that a highly complex, long-running and expensive investigation would be required.
从Burford,受托人寻求帮助s team of asset recovery specialists. We have experience partnering with resource-strapped insolvency estates, in which our role typically entails identifying assets, formulating a legal route to recovery, and funding the ultimate recovery of those assets. In the case of our debtors, Smith and Jones, it became clear early on in our investigation that they may have squirreled away some of the fraud proceeds into cryptocurrencies. Far from being a dead-end, we uncovered actionable intelligence with the use of traditional tools in the insolvency war chest that lead us to new third-parties, offshore accounts, and sight of fund flows suggestive of Smith and Jones’s access to substantial liquid assets that they did not disclose to the trustees.
Process
We had reason to suspect that Smith and Jones held undisclosed cryptocurrency assets. Our initial desk-based research identified various domains for bitcoin investment websites registered by known proxies of Smith and Jones at around the time of their bankruptcies, when they were registering other offshore businesses which were used to siphon proceeds of the fraud. We knew from their backgrounds that Smith and Jones were tech-savvy investors, so it seemed possible that they knew their BTC from their ETH, and how cryptocurrency investing and trading could make them some money.
Our suspicions were confirmed when we obtained documents which appeared to show payments, albeit nominal sums, being made by Smith and Jones to UK-based cryptocurrency exchanges. We got hold of these documents via a combination of traditional disclosure orders and overseas discovery mechanisms. What we did not understand, however, was why the exchanges also appeared to be making payments back to Smith and Jones.
We approached one of the UK-based exchanges for disclosure of all records relating to Jones, Smith and their proxies. The exchange disclosed a host of information, including bitcoin wallets, bitcoin addresses, and transaction IDs, information which (aside from the exchange) is only usually held by the holder of the Bitcoins or the parties in a Bitcoin transaction. Bitcoin addresses, for instance, are like email addresses, but instead of sending messages they are used to send and receive Bitcoin. The exchange also disclosed details of a six-figure sum deposited into the exchange from an offshore account held by third-party company incorporated in a banking secrecy jurisdiction. Crucially, the exchange disclosed that the contact on the account and the owner of the company was Smith and Jones’s known proxy.
结果
What our analysis showed was that Smith and Jones’s bagman attempted to pay a UK bitcoin exchange on three separate occasions: first, direct from his Belize bank account; second, from a Dubai account held by a third-party company; and third, via a third-party payment processor. On the first two occasions the payment was returned because the bagman failed the exchange’s KYC and AML tests. By verifying the bitcoin addresses and transaction IDs associated with his third payment in the blockchain (at www.blockchain.com/explorer) and cross-referencing with the payment dates we saw on various account statements, we were able to map Smith and Jones’s crypto fund flows, transactions from one wallet/address to another, during the period of their insolvencies.
Conclusion
Ultimately, our inkling that Smith and Jones held digital assets lead us to seek disclosure from cryptocurrency agents, such as exchanges, that ultimately lead us to previously undisclosed bank accounts, third-party companies and domains outside of the jurisdiction. This crucial intelligence contributed to our overall understanding of Smith and Jones’s modus operandi and our global enforcement strategy, particularly when used in conjunction with the traditional powers available to insolvency practitioners.
As with most investigations, new leads typically raise more questions than they do answers, but hopefully this case study shows that Bitcoin should never be a dead-end. Information can be gleaned about cryptocurrencies and can progress your investigation, provided you’re knocking on the right doors!
鲁珀特黑色
Burford Capital
